A Conversation with Tony Saich: Mao, Xi, and the Politics of Party History

Q: Comparisons between Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong are common in media and academic literature. But you argue that the analogy can be misleading: Mao was fundamentally a revolutionary, willing to upend political structures that frustrated him, whereas Xi is fundamentally a bureaucrat who has strengthened and centralized the existing apparatus. If we think of Xi simply as a “new Mao,” what do we misunderstand about how he actually governs?

A: While it may appear superficially as if Xi Jinping is the second coming of Mao Zedong, the practice of rule and the circumstances of his leadership are quite distinct. While Xi’s rule might approximate that of Mao in the early 1950s, when nation-building and recovery were the order of the day, there is no comparison with the Mao of the late-1950s and the Cultural Revolution, despite some accounts writing of a Cultural Revolution revival. Yet, Xi has used Mao’s legacy to promote his own rule. There are certain similarities in leadership style: the concentration of power in his own hands, the conscious promotion of a cult of personality, invoking the personalization of power. Similarly, Xi stresses the importance of ideology as a guide to action and uses key Maoist practices such as the “mass line” and “united front.”

However, Xi is a product of the system that he has grown up within; unlike Mao, he is not its creator. This sets constraints around his ability to rule, despite accounts of his overwhelming dominance of the political system. Having risen through the bureaucracy, he needs to operate and implement his policy preferences through the existing institutions. This makes Xi a more predictable leader with less freedom than some observers might expect. Despite extending his presidency for a third term, he rules through the existing structures rather than working outside of or around them. He needs to bring colleagues along with him, rather than pushing them into acceptance.

Q: One of the key arguments in your recent writing is that Xi exercises greater formal control over the policymaking apparatus than his recent predecessors, yet Xi is also much more dependent on the Communist Party as an institution. Mao could turn against the Party when it frustrated him; Xi needs the Party to rule. As you put it at one point, “Xi is nothing without the Party, but the Party was nothing without Mao.” What does that distinction tell us about the nature, and perhaps the limits, of Xi’s power?

A: Certainly Xi has consolidated power in a manner that few expected when he was appointed. His fear of a system slipping out of central control and meeting a similar fate to that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has driven his agenda for centralizing decision-making. He has abolished the safeguards that the Deng Xiaoping leadership put in place to prevent another Mao. This has provided Xi with the political dominance that his immediate predecessors did not enjoy. However, Mao’s and Xi’s views of the Party are significantly different. For Mao, the Party was the key tool to reach his goals, but, as you note, he was willing to cast it aside temporarily when he viewed it and its bureaucrats as an obstacle to achieving his objectives. By contrast, for Xi the Party is the crucial institution that holds the system together. It is essential to everything that he wants to achieve and unlike Mao, Xi must act through the Party. At one level, this gives a level of predictability to Xi’s rule, while the post of General Secretary gives him institutional power. However, the durability can be questioned as he is dependent on the position rather than historic achievement and charismatic power.

Q: You show that the Party’s three major historical resolutions did very different kinds of political work. Mao’s 1945 resolution and Deng’s 1981 resolution criticized the past in order to justify a new direction. Xi’s 2021 resolution instead emphasizes continuity, presenting his leadership as the logical outcome of the Party’s historical development. Why was establishing that continuity so important to Xi? And what does controlling the interpretation of the past allow a leader to accomplish politically?

A: As Xi has noted, “To destroy a nation, one must first erase its history.” Thus, it is incumbent on any current leadership to provide the “correct” interpretation of the past to reinforce its legitimacy. However, Xi does not enjoy the revolutionary credentials of either Mao or Deng. His own history is one of a gradual rise through the bureaucratic ranks. Mao had a distinct purpose in overseeing the 1945 resolution. It was to discredit his rivals for power and to cement his own preeminence. For Deng, the 1981 resolution was intended to draw a line under the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution and the cult of the individual, while permitting the shift in economic approach to development. For Xi, there is no such apparent purpose; he had already consolidated power and shifted both politics and economics to the left.

With the 100th anniversary of the Party’s founding, some form of acknowledgement was inevitable. Xi was able to use this opportunity, lacking the historical achievements of Mao and Deng, to show that the Party was the logical inheritor of not only the last 100 years but of the entire span of Chinese history. Clearly, his position as General Secretary cast him as the essential figure to lead China forward into the new era. Controlling the narrative is crucial to any leader in China as it defines the interpretation of the past and consolidates the incumbent’s position, authorizing their ability to lay out the policy plans for the future.

Q: Deng’s 1981 resolution was, among other things, an effort to preserve Mao’s legitimacy while acknowledging catastrophic mistakes and rebuilding collective leadership. Under Xi, you note that the 2021 resolution is largely silent on the 1981 resolution’s concerns about the cult of the individual and excessive concentration of power. What does that silence tell us about how the Party’s understanding of the risks of political leadership has changed under Xi?

A: Actually, the 2021 resolution has little choice but to accept the 1981 verdicts on the Cultural Revolution. It does not drill down in detail, and various publications in the run-up to the Resolution sought to work around those harsh judgments. Official publications referred to those years as a period of “arduous exploration and achievement in development.” Coverage is brief, and decisions and documents are noted as issued by the Party organizations rather than attributing them to Mao’s initiatives. This reflects aspects of leadership under Xi. First, it facilitates the development of a personality cult around Xi to underpin his institutional role. Second, it contributes to the theme of continuity rather than rupture. There are not two periods of post-1949 history, one before and one after 1978. This allows the use of Mao’s name to provide support to Xi’s rule as well as allowing him to utilize certain Maoist practices. Third, while the 1945 and 1981 resolutions identify “leftism” as the major threat to the Party, the 2021 resolution implies that the greater threat comes from the “right.” This facilitates Xi’s crackdown on critics, more independent intellectuals and publications, and the imposition of a more rigid political orthodoxy.

Q: There is another intriguing figure running through your analysis in the form of Liu Shaoqi. You suggest that organizationally, Xi may actually resemble Liu more than Mao, particularly in his emphasis on the disciplined Leninist party and self-cultivation. You describe Liu as the “ultimate Confucian Leninist.” Is Liu in some respects a better historical analogue for understanding Xi than Mao? What becomes visible when we make that comparison?

A: Given that Liu was purged and died in prison during the Cultural Revolution, it is perhaps ironic that he launched the Mao cult in the 1940s. Primarily, he saw this as a counterweight to the build-up of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader. Despite this, at the core Liu was a firm believer in the organizational principles of a Leninist party to carry out policy. Liu gave his Leninism a Confucian twist. In light of this, I see Liu as a more fitting comparison for Xi than Mao. Xi is a firm believer in the power of a Leninist party but has allowed a cult of personality to flourish around him. Liu’s 1939 work on how to be a good Communist Party member, a Confucian communist framing of the world, is reflected in Xi’s thinking and the application of a caricature of Confucianism. Liu, like Xi, called for self-cultivation, but now with Marx and Lenin to be studied.

Q: Your comparison also extends beyond domestic politics. You argue that Mao and Xi both sought to reshape the international order, but that Xi possesses tools, power, and influence that Mao could scarcely have imagined. At the same time, you describe Xi’s vision as more coherent than Mao’s, particularly in its appeal to the developing world and the Global South. How should we understand the relationship between Xi’s domestic political project, centered on a strong and disciplined Party, and his vision for China’s role in reshaping the international order?

A: Xi follows the Party’s founders’ desire to construct a new world order. Of course, the desired order has changed over time. While not rejecting the current global order in its entirety, the Party’s current mission is to restructure the global order to reflect China’s core interests and priorities. Xi’s approach has returned to Mao’s original assessment of the U.S. as the major threat, while restoring collaborative relations with Russia under Putin. This suspicion of the West drives a Party-directed policy to reduce dependence on Western technologies and promote indigenous innovation. Under Xi and the Party, the economy is directed to developing dominance in the standard setting for the technologies of the future. The export of these technologies will bring not only economic benefits but also enhanced geopolitical influence. As part of this, Xi has positioned China as a standard bearer for those countries in the developing world that reject U.S. dominance. Xi sees China’s developmental path as an effective alternative to that of the West and one that could be a model for other nations. The carrots of investment and trade are partnered with the stick of the Party’s sovereignty claims in the region.

Anthony Saich is the director of the Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia and Daewoo Professor of International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the positions of the Ash Center or its affiliates.