This paper seeks to explain the logic of Chinese regional planning pertaining to the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (粤港澳大湾区 , hereafter GBA) and the challenges it entails for spatial development. Three questions guide the inquiry of this research: First, what are the institutional underpinnings of the GBA initiative, and how is the path dependency of regional integration in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) unique compared to that in China’s other coastal macroregions? Second, how does Beijing’s changing strategy toward Hong Kong inform the costs and limits of the GBA initiative, and what are their policy implications for the future development of the PRD? Third, why is regional planning uniquely favored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) central leadership, and what does this tell us about the changing policy parameters that govern center-local relations in China?
This paper argues that the GBA initiative is an overly ambitious plan with very few policy instruments and little regulatory flexibility. It contends that the tensions between the GBA’s intended goals and the means of policy implementation are jointly resulted by three factors:
Beijing’s emerging inclination toward using regional planning as an instrument to police center-local relations and cement its national security interests rather than using it as a mere instrument of economic governance.
The declining room for policy experimentation at the local level, which reduces the state’s responsiveness to local demands and capacity to learn from mistakes.
The historical and strategic importance of the Pearl River Delta to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which causes Beijing to prioritize the political interests of PRD integration much more than its pursuit for regional development in China’s other macroregions.
These changes are reflective of a broader paradigm shift in Beijing’s regional developmental strategies, under the climate of power centralization in the Xi Jinping era (2012–present). Finally, this paper demonstrates that such changes in the CCP’s regional planning in relation to the GBA initiative will engender both the decline of adaptive governance and premature deindustrialization.
The Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia and the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore Forge Academic Partnership
The Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia at the Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University and the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore, are delighted to announce a new academic collaboration.
This past semester, the Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia engaged in conversations and research on topics ranging from Indonesia’s election to US-Taiwan relations with the goal of continuing to develop policy solutions to the region’s most pressing concerns.
Understanding the next phase of US-China relations
From the potential for revived tariffs to the implications for global collaboration, Rajawali Director Tony Saich examines the key dynamics shaping what could be a pivotal era in US-China relations.
The Determining Elements of the New Great Power Competition: Unpacking the Race for Technological Supremacy
In his latest occasional paper, Ronen Medzini, Rajawali Fellow, explains that while the US and China are not strangers to the “great power” competition, technology supremacy has superseded ideology as what lies at the crux of these dynamics. He goes on to examine critical technologies, their key attributes, and their impacts on national security, commerce, and society while exploring strategies for achieving technological superiority.
In his latest occasional paper, Dan Murphy explores whether partnering with these universities is advisable given the national security implications. Murphy argues that while caution is warranted, American universities should not shy away from all potential collaborations with the Seven Sons.